


NOTE FROM THE SERIES EDITORS

Palgrave's Recovering Political Philosophy series was founded with an eye to postmodernism's challenge to the possibility of a rational foundation for and guidance of our political lives. This invigorating challenge has provoked a searching re-examination of classic texts, not only of political philosophers, but of poets, artists, theologians, scientists, and other thinkers who may not be regarded conventionally as political theorists. The series publishes studies that endeavor to take up this re-examination and thereby help to recover the classical grounding for civic reason, as well as studies that clarify the strengths and the weaknesses of modern philosophic rationalism. The interpretative studies in the series are particularly attentive to historical context and language, and to the ways in which both censorial persecution and didactic concerns have impelled prudent thinkers, in widely diverse cultural conditions, to employ manifold strategies of writing—strategies that allowed them to aim at different audiences with various degrees of openness to unconventional thinking. The series offers close readings of ancient, medieval, early modern, and late modern works that illuminate the human condition by attempting to answer its deepest, enduring questions, and that have (in the modern periods) laid the foundations for contemporary political, social, and economic life.

Together with Plato and Aristophanes, Xenophon is one of only three thinkers whose writings on Socrates, the founder of political philosophy, survive intact. Long admired and enjoyed by political philosophers, Xenophon's writings came into disfavor—significantly—at about the same time that the deepest reasons for esoteric writing began to be lost. Recent scholarship on Xenophon, which has taken advantage of the recovery of those reasons, has begun to restore Xenophon's writings to their former rank. Eric Buzzetti's *Xenophon, the Socratic Prince* is a major contribution to that effort. It is the first book-length treatment of the *Anabasis* that takes seriously Xenophon's Socratic education, and hence the central issues of political philosophy as they come to sight in the

actual political leadership of human beings. His argument is as novel as it is convincing, and significantly extends the recent scholarship on Xenophon, including his Socratic agreements with and divergences from Machiavelli. Buzzetti manifests a deep knowledge of the whole corpus of Xenophon's writings, and he deftly and unobtrusively incorporates it into his analysis of the *Anabasis*. This book will be of great interest to all who teach the *Anabasis*, to students of Xenophon's work, to students of classical political philosophy and the history of political philosophy, to classicists, and to historians.



Map by A. Enescu

INTRODUCTION

THE POLITICAL LIFE AND THE SOCRATIC EDUCATION

In an age where the ability of reason to answer the age-old Socratic question of the best way of life is widely doubted, the quiet wisdom of Xenophon has been rediscovered with profit and delight by a new generation of readers. For much of the last two centuries, Xenophon was censured by academic authorities as a treasonous Athenian, a limited Socratic, and a hypocrite in matters of morality and piety. In more recent time, however, this rash censure has been challenged by several valuable studies that have begun to restore the signal reputation he enjoyed in Antiquity and well into nineteenth century as an outstanding general and a genuine philosopher. The present interpretation of the *Anabasis of Cyrus*, often regarded today as Xenophon's masterpiece, aims to contribute to the rehabilitation of one of the great men of Antiquity.

The *Anabasis of Cyrus* tells a memorable story. Our hero, a youthful Athenian and student of Socrates, accepts an invitation to travel to Asia Minor and join a military expedition organized by Cyrus the Younger, the brother of the King of Persia. The purpose of the expedition, it is said, is to quell an insurrection in Cyrus's dominions. Yet the secret and true aim of Cyrus is in fact to overthrow his brother and take his place as King of Persia. The *Anabasis* is the story of how Cyrus assembles a small army of Greek mercenaries—the so-called Ten Thousand—and leads them from the coast of Asia Minor, through the deserts of Arabia and up to the gates of Babylon, where he meets his brother in battle. The Greek mercenaries win a remarkable victory that becomes Pyrrhic when Cyrus is killed in the fight. To make matters much worse, the generals of the Greeks are soon ensnared and murdered by the Persians. At that point the plight of the Ten Thousand, leaderless and alone in the heart of hostile Persia, appears desperate. But Xenophon emerges from obscurity and thrusts himself forward. Elected general, he manages to overcome

countless dangers and to lead the host to the safety of "The Sea! The Sea!" The *Anabasis* tells the greatest survival story to have come down to us from Antiquity.

1. Morality and Advantage in Rule: The Noble and the Good

Yet the *Anabasis of Cyrus* is much more than a memorable story. The aim of the present study is to show that it is also a work of political philosophy, and to begin with, a study of the political relevance of the Socratic education. The *Anabasis* contains an analysis of how an outstanding student of Socrates became, through the Socratic education, better able to rule human beings. In their respective writings, Xenophon and Plato both present Socrates as a teacher of politics. They show him introducing himself to potential pupils as a teacher of what is sometimes called the kingly or royal art, the art of ruling with knowledge.¹ It is therefore reasonable for us to wonder: What contribution, if any, did Socrates's teaching of this art make to the successes of Xenophon? How was *he* prepared for rule? This question is at the heart of the present study. But I also develop a more paradoxical line of argument. I contend that the *Anabasis* is intended to serve, in the economy of Xenophon's writings, as an introduction to philosophy. The highest aim of the work is *not* to prepare for politics (or for the exercise of rule) but to educate ambition and cause high-minded and talented youths to consider the alternative embodied by Socrates. In other words, the *Anabasis* is an introduction to philosophy in the form of a critique of the political life. I hope to make this claim less paradoxical than it must now appear.

* * *

Let us begin by considering how the political life is approached in the *Anabasis*. Here it is useful to call to mind the most famous book on rule, Niccolò Machiavelli's *Prince*. In a well-known passage, Machiavelli claims that it is necessary for a prince to learn to be able not be good if he wants to maintain himself in power (chap. 15). A complete reconciliation of morality and advantage is impossible, Machiavelli contends, since human conditions do not admit of it. A prince must learn to be bad. This is of course a perennial issue: Is it possible for a ruler to be at once good and effective? But what is *Xenophon's* view of it? Does he agree with

Machiavelli that morality and advantage cannot be conjoined or reconciled in and through rule?

This study will show that the *Anabasis* examines the political life from the standpoint of this question. The work sketches three models of rule, depicting how the three men who successively rule the Ten Thousand as *de facto* kings—Cyrus, Klearchos, and Xenophon—endeavor to reconcile morality with advantage. Of course, the most important of these models is Xenophon himself. His career is depicted in the last five books of the *Anabasis*. But two alternative models are also presented. Book one depicts the rule of Cyrus, the younger brother of the King of Persia, who meets with an untimely death in the Battle for Babylon (1.8). And book two depicts the rule of Klearchos, a Lacedaemonian who takes over after Cyrus and is ensnared and killed at the end of book two. As I intend to show, the *Anabasis* spells out how, according to Xenophon, these three models of rule meet (or fail to meet) the challenge of reconciling morality with advantage. To put the matter as Xenophon himself would have put it, the *Anabasis* depicts how these rulers endeavor to reconcile "the noble with the good." But before I proceed any further, let me try to situate these models of rule briefly.

Cyrus embodies the first model. I call him the Godlike King. The name is meant to indicate that Cyrus rejects the traditional gods—several scenes adumbrate his impiety—but also that he seeks to become a sort of deity on Earth. He aspires to become an all-powerful and all-knowing king over a large portion of mankind. In effect, the title of our work—the "Ascent of Cyrus"—refers not only to a march upland (as it undoubtedly does) but also to the rise of a man who, should he conquer the Persian throne, would be in a position to dispense a kind of secular providence. As King of Persia, Cyrus would be in a position to reward and punish the vast human multitudes under his rule in accordance with merit. He would be able (in principle at least) to reconcile the noble with the good in the sense that the goodness of virtue among a large portion of mankind would be put beyond question. In other words, "Cyrus the King" is an alternative to "Zeus the King." But the question then arises: Does the "Ascent of Cyrus" herald the dawn of universal justice? Can the problem of justice be solved, according to Xenophon, through the establishment of a human kingship at once absolute, high-minded, and of enormous geographic scope? This question is treated in book one of the *Anabasis*. It is analyzed in the first part of this study (chapter one).

The Lacedaemonian Klearchos embodies the second model of rule. I call him the Pious King. In marked contrast to Cyrus, Klearchos bows before Zeus the King and pays homage to this deity. He trusts in the superior prudence and in the just providence of what he regards as the King of

¹ For example, *Memorabilia* 1.6.15, 4.2 (esp. §11); *Alcibiades I* (beginning). The art in question is the BASILIKĒ TECHNĒ.

Kings. This means that he consults Zeus regularly through sacrifices and oracles. But does piety hold the key to a successful reconciliation of the noble with the good? Is the Pious King superior to the Godlike King? For, abiding by what he thinks the gods demand of him—abiding by the demands of piety and virtue—Klearchos hopes to secure divine assistance and help. Is this hope well founded? Needless to say, Machiavelli would deride any such notion. Every reader of the *Prince* knows that Machiavelli urges rulers to rely on *their own* weapons. They should imitate King David, he writes, who fought Goliath with *his own* sling and *his own* knife (chap.13). But does Xenophon approve of rulers who rely on *heavenly* weapons? After all, Xenophon is still thought of today as a paragon of piety.² Yet, as we will discover, he depicts a grave error of judgment of Klearchos, which had fatal consequences (2.5). Could it be that Xenophon is in fact a critic of the Pious Kingship? This question, treated in book two of the *Anabasis*, is analyzed in the second part of this study (chapter two).

The third model of rule is embodied by Xenophon himself. I call him the Socratic King. The bulk of the *Anabasis* depicts how *he* endeavors to conjoin or reconcile the noble with the good. Specifically, each one of the five books that depict and analyze his rule brings to light how he reconciles the demands of one specific virtue with the imperatives of safety and political advantage. Book three, for example, is the book of piety because it shows us how Xenophon reconciles piety—his own piety as well as the piety of the soldiers—with the political good. Book four is the book of courage; book five is the book of justice; book six is the book of gratitude; and book seven is the book of what Xenophon calls “PHILOSTRATIŌTĒS” (i.e., “the love of the soldier”: cf. 7.6.4, 7.6.39). In each case, Xenophon shows us how (as a ruler) he reconciles the virtue or quality in question with the political good. Hence, the third part of this study analyzes piety (chapter three), courage (chapter four), justice (chapter five), gratitude (chapter six) and the love of the soldier (chapter seven). The place that each quality is assigned in the rule of the Socratic King is each time considered.

The present study uncovers for the first time what I believe is the authentic plan of the *Anabasis*, the plan devised by Xenophon when he composed the work. I show that the *Anabasis* is not only a historical chronicle and a war memoir—I readily concede that it is both these things as well—but above all *an argument* or a *logos*³ developed in and through a chronicle and a memoir. Hence the various episodes of the work, and the manner of treatment of these episodes, reflect the stages and the demands

² See, for example, Waterfield (2006) pp. 42–43, Cawkwell (1979) p. 45, Parker (2004).

³ For the *Anabasis* as “logos,” see 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1, 5.1.1, 7.1.1.

of the argument. Minor episodes are sometimes developed at length while major episodes are sketched more summarily. To take a single example here: toward the end of the expedition, the reader is made to witness a symposium that features a longish scene of dancing among the soldiers (6.1.4–13). The scene is entertaining. But why is it treated at such length? Is dancing somehow important for the *logos* of the *Anabasis*? I show (in chapter six) that this seemingly minor scene conveys nothing less than the principle of Xenophon’s self-presentation in the *Anabasis*. The scene adumbrates that Xenophon thinks of himself as a Socratic—a “dancing philosopher”—dressed in martial garb. More generally, this study demonstrates that several minor scenes, including “digressions” that bear little or no apparent connection to the expedition proper, are in fact crucial stages of the philosophic argument of the *Anabasis*.⁴

The authentic plan of the *Anabasis*, reflecting a *logos* in three main stages, can therefore be summarized in a preliminary fashion as follows:

- I. The Kingship of Cyrus (Book One)
“Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Godlike King”
- II. The Kingship of Klearchos (Book Two)
“Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Pious King”
- III. The Kingship of Xenophon (Books Three to Seven)⁵
“Reconciling the Noble and the Good in and through the Rule of a Socratic King”
 1. Piety (Book Three)
 2. Courage (Book Four)
 3. Justice (Book Five)
 4. Gratitude (Book Six)
 5. The Love of the Soldier (Philostratiŏtēs) (Book Seven).

My reading of the *Anabasis* is bound to raise a number of objections.⁶ Allow me to consider only two for now. It could be argued that Xenophon

⁴ For example, the famous “digression” on Skillōis: 5.3.

⁵ Readers will be in a position to make interesting discoveries if they compare the implicit plan of Part III of the *Anabasis* with the explicit plan of the *Agésilas* (a work dedicated to a model king as well). Suffice it to note here that in the *Agésilas*, Xenophon begins all his accounts of the virtues or qualities of the Spartan king with piety (c. 3 [beginning], 10.2, 11.1). This helps confirm that book three of the *Anabasis*—the first book treating the kingship of Xenophon—is the book of piety.

⁶ My claim to have discovered the authentic plan of the *Anabasis* implies, of course, that the division of the work into seven books goes back to Xenophon. I know of no weighty

is not a genuine Socratic and that his political successes should not be viewed in light of his education. Indeed, the few scholars who have stressed the theme of education in their study of the *Anabasis* have linked Xenophon's successes to his *Athenian* education.⁷ After all, the fact that Xenophon chooses to *leave* Socrates (and the philosophic life) to befriend Cyrus (and for a political life) in the single most important scene of the *Anabasis* seems to prove that he views the political life as superior to the philosophic (3.1). Doesn't this choice even prove that he failed to grasp the Socratic argument for the superiority of philosophy? How, then, can I rightly call Xenophon a Socratic? A second objection would stress that Xenophon is never actually elected sole ruler of the army. His elevation to the "monarchy" is seriously considered but it never comes to pass (cf. 6.1.31). How, then, can I rightly call him a king?

I will show that Xenophon's decision to befriend Cyrus (and to leave Socrates) was *not* the result of a rejection of philosophy but stemmed, in part, from the fact that Athens had become a dangerous place for a Socratic in 401 BC. The trial and execution of Socrates a few months after Xenophon's departure from Athens was to illustrate this danger with shocking clarity. Textual evidence will be adduced that Xenophon's decision to leave must be viewed in light of his dimming prospects at home. Nor is it adequate to ascribe Xenophon's successes to his *Athenian* education: there were several other Athenians among the Ten Thousand but only he rose to the challenge of saving the army. Better to take our bearings by the author's explicit indications that *Socrates* was crucially important for him. Indeed, in the most important scene of the *Anabasis* just referred to, Xenophon makes clear that he sought the counsel of Socrates—and of no one else—before joining Cyrus and Proxenos (3.1.4–10). Xenophon quietly presents himself as a Socratic.

As for the second objection, it is admittedly correct that Xenophon is never elected sole ruler of the Ten Thousand. But this objection is not decisive. Xenophon *does* exercise *de facto* kingship in book five.⁸ Besides,

argument against this view, though the opposite is occasionally asserted (e.g., Masqueray [1930] p. 6; Couvreur [1929] p. 104, note 1 and *passim*). Yet even Masqueray, who doubts the authenticity of the division, admits that it is mentioned in Antiquity "par Hérodién, Harpocraton, Diogène, Athénée" (p. 6). The correct view, as I believe, has been stated powerfully by Høeg (1950, pp. 162–64). The division of the *Anabasis* into seven books is found in all the complete MSS. For further discussion, see Appendix 2.

⁷ See, notably, Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 87. Also Erbse (2010) p. 491. The outstanding exception is Bruell (1987).

⁸ He exercises the kingship during a long absence of the *primus inter pares*, the Lacedaemonian general Cheirisophos. This seldom-noted fact makes book five the most important of the five books devoted to Xenophon's rule. (Cheirisophos leaves at the beginning of book five and returns—two months later—at the beginning of book six.)

while he is never elected "monarch," the same can be said of Cyrus and Klearchos (cf. 2.2.5). Indeed, Socrates is reported to have said that it is not election but knowledge of how to rule that makes a man a king.⁹ Xenophon, as we will see, holds the same view.¹⁰

But (it will be asked) what exactly is the Socratic education? It seems that I must answer this question before I can analyze how Xenophon puts his education to work, so to speak, in the *Anabasis*. And, it would appear, I must develop my answer through a study of the Socratic writings. For several reasons, however, not the least of which is that my task would become unmanageable, I will *not* take this path here. Though I will often refer to Xenophon's four Socratic writings—the *Memorabilia*, the *Oikonomikos*, the *Symposium*, and the *Apology of Socrates to the Jurors*—and though I will analyze some key passages from these works, for the most part I will look directly at the finished product—Xenophon himself—as he is seen in the *Anabasis*. Yet it will not be amiss if I state at the outset what I mean by the Socratic education. Following Xenophon's indications in the *Memorabilia*, the Socratic education can be said to consist, at its core, in a thorough investigation of what virtue is. This investigation includes a comprehensive reflection on the character of, and the relation between, the noble and the good.¹¹ Indeed, Xenophon shows in the *Oikonomikos* that Socrates was once eager to converse with the noble and good man Ischomachos in order to discover how "the good is attached to the noble" in his person.¹² In other words, what I am calling the question of the noble and the good is but another way of referring to the age-old Socratic question, "What is virtue?" One aim of the present study is to analyze the political benefits, as well as the results, of the Socratic inquiry into virtue.

2. Xenophon's Manner of Writing: The Question of Esotericism

Before I interpret the *Anabasis*, I must explain how I read Xenophon. Since the issue is important, my explanation must be substantial. No

⁹ *Memorabilia* 3.9.10, 3.1.4.

¹⁰ One sign that kingship is the theme of the *Anabasis* is the fact that the word "king" (BASILEUS) occurs at least 144 times in the work (according to the Perseus Digital Project). This number is substantially larger than the number of occurrences of the word in the *Education of Cyrus* (at least 100), a work longer than the *Anabasis* by perhaps 25 percent. And of course, the *Education of Cyrus* is unquestionably focused on the theme of kingship and its establishment.

¹¹ *Memorabilia* 1.1.16.

¹² *Oikonomikos* 6.15.

interpreter of Xenophon has been more influential and controversial in modern times than the philosopher Leo Strauss. His rediscovery of the art of esoteric writing—and his claim that Xenophon practiced this art—has been accepted in some quarters but has met with spirited resistance in others.¹³ It is a pleasure to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Strauss. The present study is both premised upon and a defense of the claim that he was the first to formulate that Xenophon is an esoteric writer capable of the most refined forms of irony. Yet I confess my sympathy for critics who have charged that Strauss's students and followers have occasionally used esotericism to obfuscate or distort, rather than to illuminate, great texts of the past. That a particular chapter is at the "center" of a book, for example—to mention a much-maligned Straussian hermeneutical principle—is not an argument for anything. It is a fact, and not a very interesting fact at that. Nevertheless, facts are liable to occur in patterns, and patterns should be an object of careful examination.

I wish to approach the question of esotericism as fruitfully and unproblematically as possible. To do so, I will consider Xenophon's treatment of the question of piety and the gods. For as we will discover, the three models of kingship presented in the *Anabasis* differ profoundly on the issue of the place that piety and the gods should have in rule. (In fact, the question of the noble and the good is ultimately inseparable from the issue of piety, as we will see.) Of course, it would not be particularly surprising if we should discover that Xenophon exercised restraint when he wrote about piety and the gods. We have already alluded to the fate of Socrates, who was executed by the Athenians partly for not believing in the gods in which the city believed. Moreover, Socrates was neither the first philosopher to fall victim to politico-religious persecution in the West, nor was he to be the last. We citizens of liberal democracies are rediscovering today after a hiatus of over two centuries certain forms of pious virulence, which, though obviously different from premodern forms, adopt a stance toward reason, philosophy, and secular rule that is hardly unprecedented. These developments should give us pause and renew our openness toward the possibility that Xenophon wrote esoterically. For, as a thinker and an author, Xenophon faced a solidly pious world that resembled in some respects the Islamic world of today. The pious and moral opinions of his average Hellenic reader had not been transformed by anything resembling the Enlightenment, that is, by the modern project to (in the words of Montesquieu) "detach religion from the soul."¹⁴ It is not reasonable, in other words, to expect complete

¹³ The most recent spirited and extensive critique is Gray (2011a).

¹⁴ *The Spirit of the Laws*, book 25, chap. 12.

openness from Xenophon, at least if he can be shown to have rejected the orthodoxy of his day in matters of piety and morality. For, to write seriously about kingship requires a reflection on who (or what) the highest king is.¹⁵ Besides, the theme of kingship is delicate for other reasons as well: it is liable to offend democratic sensibilities.¹⁶

To many readers, these considerations will perhaps appear plausible but nevertheless unconvincing. For even if we set aside the issue of whether Xenophon challenged the orthodoxy of his day—and aren't his books replete with evidence of his conventional piety and morality?—many will feel puzzlement or disbelief at the notion that an author might convey his thought between the lines of his work. Why would anyone choose to conceal his views from the majority of his readers and only intimate them to a close-reading minority? The purpose of a book is to enlighten and convey knowledge, not to mislead. How can social progress occur if intellectuals lack the courage to challenge openly the orthodoxies of their day? Isn't esotericism the practice of a misguided or cynical elitist who thinks that the *hoi polloi* are too unintelligent to understand the truth and to benefit from it? And doesn't this practice suggest that the ideas being concealed are disreputable? Finally, the alleged "proofs" of esotericism—small textual hints—are regarded as proofs only by those who ignore the damage suffered by ancient MSS. These proofs are in fact blemishes or scribal blunders.

Proponents of esotericism must confront these powerful objections. I intend to do so. But open-minded critics must face the possibility, for their part, that their hostility to the idea of esotericism reflects the influence of an argument spelled out famously by John Stuart Mill: speech ought to be free in a civilized society because truth will win out over error if both are allowed to clash publicly in the marketplace of ideas, and because the victory of truth will be socially beneficial and conducive to intellectual progress as well.¹⁷ Whether we, citizens of liberal states, like it or not, Mill's liberal-progressive view is not Xenophon's view. As I hope to show in this study, Xenophon accepts a version of the Platonic-Socratic view stated so memorably in Plato's *Republic*: every political community is akin to a dim-lit cave. Only few human beings are ever both able and willing to

¹⁵ For a humorous treatment of this issue, see Aristophanes's *Clouds*, lines 380–82 and *passim*.

¹⁶ The true king is a practitioner of the "kingly art." But this art points toward the rule of the wise. See *Memorabilia* 1.2.58, quoting *Iliad* 2.188–91, 198–202. In the *Memorabilia* passage, Xenophon "omits" to quote *Iliad* 2.204–6, where Odysseus endorses kingly rule at the expense of democracy since "no good thing is a multitude of lords." See also Plato's *Republic* 488b6–8.

¹⁷ J.S. Mill, *On Liberty* (1998).

free themselves from the shackles enslaving their minds and ascend toward the light of the natural sun. The pursuit of truth and the authority of the "shadows" on the walls of the cave are in a state of permanent tension. It is from this tension, in part, that the practice of esotericism arises.

To be sure, we modern readers do not have to accept this Platonic-Socratic-Xenophonic view. We may even reject it wholeheartedly, just as thinkers of the Enlightenment such as Kant or (later) Mill rejected it. Yet it is imperative when we read an author who shows signs of accepting this view that we let our interpretation be guided by that fact throughout. Historical objectivity is not possible on another basis, and a failure to read accordingly is bound to distort the author's thought. I readily grant, however, that the burden of proof rests on the shoulders of those who claim, as I do, that Xenophon is an esoteric writer.

To begin to discharge this burden, I shall therefore consider a series of literary techniques employed by Xenophon in the *Anabasis* to convey his thought between the lines. In the remainder of this section, I examine how he depicts Cyrus's stance toward the gods. This brief case study is followed by a more general analysis of his manner of writing (section two).¹⁸ I then consider the manuscript tradition of the *Anabasis*. My goal is there again to explore literary devices employed by Xenophon to convey his views quietly (section three). Finally, I consider the recent scholarship on the *Anabasis* to show the importance of approaching the work as a study in Socratic rule and an introduction to philosophy (section four).

i) A Case Study: Xenophon's Depiction of Cyrus's Stance Toward the Gods

Early in their march toward Babylon, Cyrus and the Ten Thousand reach the city of Peltas where they stay for three days. Xenophon describes the scene as follows:

In those days, Xennias the Arcadian performed the sacrifices of the Lukaia and he held an athletic contest. The prizes were golden scrapers. Even Cyrus beheld the athletic contest (1.2.10).

This passage seems innocuous enough: the Ten Thousand celebrate a festival honoring Zeus Lukaion under the presidency of Xennias, a prominent Greek general. They also hold an athletic contest. Cyrus looks on. Less

¹⁸ I have benefited from several discussions of Xenophon's manner of writing. These include Bartlett (1996b), Bruell (1987), Dillery (1995), Flower (2012), Gautier (1911), Higgins (1977), Hirsch (1985), Nadon (2001), Proietti (1987), and the several works of Strauss on Xenophon.

innocuous is a detail omitted by Xenophon. Let us reproduce the same paragraph minus all the unessential information:

[...] Xenias the Arcadian performed the sacrifices of the Lukaia and he held an athletic contest (AGŌNA) [...] Cyrus beheld the athletic contest (AGŌNA).

This edited version makes conspicuous what Xenophon merely adumbrates: Cyrus beheld the athletic contest and *only* the athletic contest. He displayed publicly his indifference to the Lukaia. By the simple device of mentioning and then omitting the Lukaia, Xenophon is able to hint at this indifference. Does this mean that Cyrus is indifferent not only to a festival but to the divine more generally?

This conclusion is surely premature. Xenophon could be guilty of writing sloppy prose. Besides, it could be objected that Cyrus's indifference to the Lukaia is insignificant: he is a Persian, after all, and the festival in question was honoring a Greek god (Zeus Lukaion). To meet these difficulties, let us therefore consider a later passage of book one, which will help us confirm our budding suspicions about Cyrus.

In the passage in question, Xenophon recounts a private exchange between Cyrus and his leading Greek general, the Lacedaemonian Klearchos. The exchange takes place as Cyrus nears Babylon and the battle for the throne of Persia seems imminent:

"Do you suppose, Cyrus, [Klearchos said] that your brother will engage battle with you?" "Yes, by Zeus," said Cyrus, if at any rate he is the son of Darius and of Parysatis, and my brother, I will not take these things [i.e. the throne of Persia] without a fight" (1.7.9, my emphasis).

Once again, we have a seemingly innocuous passage. It is, however, an arresting passage insofar as it contains one of the few private exchanges of Cyrus deemed important enough to be reported. But why does Xenophon stress this private exchange? Does he wish to emphasize Cyrus's pride in his lineage or in his family virtue? Or perhaps his doubts about his brother's legitimacy?¹⁹ It is striking that Cyrus, though a Persian, swears the Greek oath "by Zeus": his indifference to Zeus Lukaion in the passage considered a moment ago cannot be explained by his Persian origin.²⁰ But what is the solution to our larger difficulty? The solution is conveyed, I believe, in the

¹⁹ Braun (2004) sees in this scene "some chivalrous joust" (p. 125).

²⁰ At *Oikonomikos* 4.24, Cyrus is made to swear the historically more accurate oath "By Mithra!" The Persian Artabazos uses the emphatic form of the same oath at *Education of Cyrus* 7.5.53. Unless I am mistaken, Cyrus the Elder always swears by Greek gods.

following way. Xenophon writes a few paragraphs later (after reporting on the exchange between Cyrus and Klearchos) that Cyrus called to his side a Greek soothsayer named Silanos and gave him a large sum of money (1.7.18). He did this, we are told, because eleven days earlier the soothsayer had predicted to Cyrus that King Artaxerxes would not fight him within the next ten days. Silanos made this prediction after he questioned the gods by means of divination. And Cyrus replied to the divination as follows: "Then [my brother] will not fight thereafter, if he will not fight within these ten days. But I promise you ten talents if you should speak the truth" (1.7.18). On the eleventh day—as the battle had not yet occurred—Cyrus paid out the promised sum to Silanos, who had predicted accurately.

Cyrus's private exchange with the general Klearchos must be read in light of his remarks to the soothsayer Silanos. Or rather, the meaning of the private exchange with Klearchos becomes clear once we restore the chronological order of these two conversations, which Xenophon has purposely reversed. First in the order of time are Cyrus's remarks to the soothsayer that his brother *must* fight within ten days if he is to fight at all. Afterward it will be too late. Then come Cyrus's private assurances to Klearchos that his brother *will* certainly fight "if he is the son of Darius and of Parysatis, and my brother." It is therefore clear that Cyrus thinks that his brother—who *must* fight within the next ten days if he is to fight at all—*will* certainly fight *within the next ten days*. But this means that he is certain that the soothsayer is wrong. He puts no faith whatsoever in Silanos's divination.²¹ No wonder, then, that Cyrus swears "By Zeus!" in his exchange with Klearchos—the only such oath he swears in the *Anabasis*.²² Far from indicating Cyrus's piety, this oath calls attention to his rejection of the god's signs. Yet this rejection does not keep Cyrus from rewarding the soothsayer for having spoken "the truth." In other words, if the two conversations are read together in their proper chronological order, it becomes clear that Cyrus rejects *in toto* the guidance of soothsayers. Xenophon conceals the import of these conversations with the simple expedient of reversing their chronological order. Had he done what I just did—to recount Cyrus's remarks to the soothsayer first—the implication of Cyrus's later private assurances to Klearchos would have been obvious. Not so when the conversations are inverted.

We are now in a position to understand why the obituary of Cyrus is silent about his piety (1.9).²³ This silence is confirmed by several

²¹ This conclusion is confirmed by 1.7.14.

²² Cyrus swears one more oath—"By the gods"—at 1.4.8. For an explanation of this oath, see chapter one, note 21.

²³ Strauss (1983) p. 107. There is, however, one reference to the fact that Cyrus may have prayed (1.9.11). See chapter 1, note 89.

additional pointers.²⁴ The impiety of Cyrus is, so to speak, the negative side of his *anabasis*, of his ascent. Moreover, the impiety of Cyrus distinguishes him from a ruler such as Klearchos, who is visibly shaken by Silanos's bold prediction that the King will not fight within ten days. Yet Cyrus's impiety (and the role that it plays in his rule) will not be appreciated unless the reader is aware that Xenophon is wont to intimate—*merely* to intimate—the darker or unconventional side of rulers, such as Cyrus, whom he depicts sympathetically. It has been claimed that Xenophon is prone to hero-worship because he separates rulers into "goodies" and "baddies," and because his "goodies" are unambiguously good.²⁵ But we see here that Xenophon is not blind to a trait of a goodie that would have been unattractive or frankly objectionable to his contemporaries, if not also to himself.

ii) *LEGETAI*, "Repetitions," and Omissions

Let me now broaden the discussion to take up several literary techniques employed by Xenophon to convey his thought esoterically. The first such technique is the use of the phrase "it is said" (*LEGETAI*).²⁶ Xenophon often writes that an event "is said" to have happened or that a person "is said" to be such and such.²⁷ But of course, what "is said" may or may not hold true. Sometimes, Xenophon uses the phrase to indicate his ignorance, or to report on a tradition or a rumor about which he does not know the truth. Thus he writes that the army of the King "was said" to be 1.2 million strong and that Cyrus "was said" to have slept with a Cilician queen (1.7.11, 1.2.12). Being cognizant of the difference between knowledge and hearsay, he conveys this difference through the precision of his prose.²⁸ Sometimes, Xenophon uses the phrase "it is said" to intimate his doubts about what is said, or his knowledge that things are not what they are said to be. For example, he writes that "it is said" that the Greek general Menōn, the man who would betray his fellow Greeks to

²⁴ For example, there is not a single reference to the so-called Magi (an Iranian priestly caste) or to any other priests in the army of Cyrus. By contrast, the host of Cyrus the Elder was teeming with them: *Education of Cyrus* 4.5.51, 4.6.11, 5.3.4, 7.3.1, 7.5.35, 7.5.57, 8.1.23, 8.3.11; also 8.3.24.

²⁵ For example, Wylie (1992) p. 117.

²⁶ Strauss (1983) pp. 107–8.

²⁷ For example, *Anabasis* 1.2.8, 1.8.20, 2.6.8, 2.6.29, 3.4.11, 4.1.3, 6.2.1, 6.2.2. Sometimes, Xenophon uses the alternative formula "they said" (*EPHASAN*): e.g., 4.3.12, 5.2.31.

²⁸ Cawkwell (1979) claims that "Xenophon, as it were, experienced by hearsay"—that is, that he failed to distinguish between hearsay evidence and direct experience (p. 24). The claim is misleading and without merit. A small but characteristic example of Xenophon's precision occurs at 1.4.4.

the Persians, did not reap the fruits of his treason. He was tortured for a whole year by the Persian King—the very man whom he had helped—before being put to death (2.6.29). Yet “it is said” that Menōn suffered this fate. Are we to understand that Menōn may have met with a happier or less gloomy end? Could this explain why Xenophon “omits” to state the age of Menōn at the time of his death whereas he conveys this piece of information in the case of every other murdered general (cf. 2.6.29 with §15, §20, and §30)? Lest there be any doubt in this case, Diodorus Siculus and Plutarch both confirm that Menōn was *not* put to death by the Persian King along with the generals he had betrayed.²⁹

There is thus unobtrusive but unmistakable evidence that Xenophon uses the phrase “it is said” to achieve something of a beautification of the political world. He makes politics appear to be more supportive of morality and piety than he thinks it really is. By using this phrase, he is able to intimate the unadorned truth—in this case, he questions a vision of poetic justice—while presenting a more hopeful picture to his incautious readers.³⁰ If Xenophon is cognizant of the darker side of his “goodies,” he is not blind to the successes of his “baddies” either.

To be sure, it is not easy to understand why Xenophon wrote in this manner. After all, is it not risky to conceal the ugliness of the political

²⁹ Diodorus Siculus (2000) 14.27.2; Plutarch, *Life of Artaxerxes* c. 22. Plutarch’s account is explicitly based on that of Ktésias, a Greek physician at the court of Persia, whose *Persika* now exists only in short summaries by later authors, especially by Photius, a ninth-century scholar and patriarch of Constantinople. Xenophon refers to Ktésias twice at 1.8.26–27. He therefore knew that Menōn was not put to death. (One of Photius’s summaries—of books 21–23—states explicitly that Menōn was spared.)—It should be said, however, that Plutarch questions the credibility of Ktésias, though not on the issue of Menōn’s survival (in §1). Braun (2004) also impugns Ktésias’s veracity (p. 123). For Xenophon’s reliance on Ktésias in the context of the *Education of Cyrus*, see Hirsch (1985) pp. 83–84.

³⁰ The use of *LEGETAI* as a literary technique is not taken into account by Sandridge (2012), for example, in his study of the *Education of Cyrus*. This causes him to overlook an important point: Xenophon never actually says in his own name (at *Education of Cyrus* 1.2.1) that Cyrus the Elder is “most loving of humanity (PHILANTHROPOTATOS), most loving of learning (PHILOMATHESTATOS), and most loving of being honored (PHILOTIMOTATOS).” What Xenophon does say is this: Cyrus “still even to this day is said in word (*LEGETAI*) and celebrated in song by the barbarians” to have possessed a soul endowed with the three qualities in question. In fact, one of the first things Xenophon indicates about Cyrus the Elder is that he was not “most loving of learning” justice in particular (1.3.15–18). Great political ambition is linked by Xenophon to a lack of love of knowledge of justice or virtue, that is, to a deficiency in point of intellectual and moral fastidiousness. Observe also that “love of learning” is not mentioned at *Education* 1.4.1—in the wake of the lack of love of knowledge of justice that Xenophon brings out at 1.3.15–18—whereas “love of humanity” and “love of being honored” both are. When the “love of learning” of Cyrus is again mentioned, at 1.4.3, Xenophon makes clear that this love does *not* extend to the subject of justice: Cyrus must be *compelled* to learn justice by his teacher.

world? Would it not be better to depict this ugliness openly, perhaps in the manner of a Machiavelli (who can be said to have exaggerated its ugliness) in order to put one’s readers on notice? For, by writing the way he does, Xenophon sets a trap, or so it seems, for high-minded but insufficiently cautious readers.

Interpreters of Xenophon must face this difficult question. In this study, I shall argue that Xenophon’s depiction of the political world reflects his view of the proper way to educate the best and most promising among his readers without abdicating his civic responsibilities. Far from reflecting a naïve or moralistic impulse, Xenophon’s attractive manner of writing is rooted in his humanity as well as his wish to put properly equipped youths on the path to philosophy. This manner of writing also reflects his taste. Xenophon says in one of his most memorable speeches of the *Anabasis* that “it is noble and just and pious, and more pleasant, to remember the good things more than the bad” (5.8.26). As the author of the *Anabasis*, Xenophon abides by this beautiful maxim of historical recollection.

Let us turn to a second literary technique. Xenophon frequently resorts to apparent “repetitions” that are in fact modifications of earlier statements. He is especially fond of this technique in connection with the speeches he delivers to the Ten Thousand. As narrator, Xenophon will give an account of an event (or his private thoughts about that event) and then show that he offered a somewhat different account of the event to the soldiers. For example, Xenophon occasionally credits the gods for certain events in his speeches while quietly ascribing these same events, in his narrative, to blind “chance” or “luck” (*TUCHĒ*). To say the least, the pious thoughts he expresses publicly are not always to be taken at face value.³¹ Of course, this does not prove that Xenophon is *not* a pious man. It merely proves that he sometimes credits the gods for what he believes must be ascribed to chance. Nor does it prove that he is a scoundrel: he does tell us the truth, after all—in his narrative. Rather, the technique of “repetition” is used to indicate where and how Xenophon adapted himself to the opinions of his men—oftentimes, to lift their spirits—thereby helping his reader explore whether truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule. In other words, the technique of “repetition” is used to analyze an aspect of the question of the noble and the good.

Xenophon employs patterns of “repetition” within the narratives themselves. In his first speech to the assembled army, for example, he

³¹ Cf. 6.3.6 with 6.3.18; 6.1.20 with 6.1.26; see also 5.2.24–25. For the distinction between “*TUCHĒ*” and “*GNÔMĒ*” (“[divine] purpose”), see *Memorabilia* 1.4.4ff, esp. §6 *in fine*.

puts forth proposals that are subject to three distinct votes. Recording the first two votes, Xenophon writes that "all raised their hands": the two proposals were carried unanimously (3.2.9, 3.2.33). Recording the result of the third vote, however—the vote pertained to the adoption of a debatable military tactic—Xenophon writes that "it was adopted" (EDOXE TAŪTA). The shift of language intimates that there was opposition (3.2.38). The incautious reader easily receives the impression that Xenophon's successes on the first day of his rule were seamless and fore-ordained. But his precision enables us to see where he had to overcome opposition.³²

If Xenophon sometimes "repeats" himself, he is also known to omit information that he has led us to expect. We have already seen how omissions are used to paint more attractive pictures of Cyrus and (of the fate) of Menōn. But the technique is employed more broadly. Upon reaching the Black Sea, Xenophon pronounces a speech in which he makes five proposals to the soldiers. All five proposals pertain to how they should henceforth conduct their affairs (5.1.5–14). After each one, Xenophon writes that the proposal "was adopted": each proposal was carried, albeit over some opposition. The fifth proposal, however (which is the third one in the order of presentation) is *not* followed by these words, or, indeed, by any words at all. Xenophon had proposed to the soldiers to continue to guard the camp. Though they had now reached the Black Sea (he said) they were still being threatened by enemies. The authorial silence of Xenophon mirrors the deafening silence of the soldiers, who allowed themselves to hope, despite the facts of the ground, that they were now safe and could put their guard down.

iii) "Being at the Center"

Let me now consider a technique that will seem odd to many readers: whatever is "at the center" of Xenophon's writings is of special importance.³³ By the phrase "at the center," I mean to say that the interpreter must always take pains to count the number of items in a list or in an enumeration, of arguments in a given passage, of chapters in a book, etc. and pay particular attention to whatever lies "at the center." (Pay special attention to the second item in a list of three, for example, or to the third argument in a passage that contains five.) Since this technique is not only odd but also controversial, I will approach it from a less foreign point of view.

³² Sometimes, Xenophon uses the technique to revisit history: cf. 7.6.14 with 7.3.14.

³³ I am indebted to Leo Strauss for the rediscovery of this technique.

It is a well-known rule of forensic rhetoric that a good lawyer will begin his pleading with a strong opening statement and end it with a strong closing. He should try to "hide" his weaker arguments somewhere in the middle of the pleading. The rationale for the rule is this: better to state one's strongest points as the attention of the jury is at a peak—at the beginning and at the end of the pleading—and pass off the weaker points as the jury's attention inevitably ebbs. Indeed this rule, which is sometimes taught in law schools today, is mentioned by Socrates himself in the *Memorabilia* in a passage where the MSS. unfortunately diverge.³⁴ Yet it is unnecessary to prove the authenticity of the passage in question. Suffice it to use the suggestion it contains as a heuristic hypothesis: Is there any evidence that Xenophon puts his weaker arguments "at the center" when he harangues the troops (or other audiences) in the *Anabasis*?

It is hard to escape the conclusion that Xenophon does do this. In his very first speech, for instance, there is a small but characteristic example of it. Xenophon is trying to encourage the captains of the recently murdered Proxenos by telling them that they can wage war on the Persians with greater confidence than their enemies can. One of the more minor reasons he offers to have confidence is this: "We have bodies that are more capable of bearing cold, heat and labors [than the Persians]" (3.1.23). Granted that the sturdy Greeks were more capable of bearing "cold" and "labors" than the Persians, but the intense "heat" of Mesopotamia as well? This stretches credulity. Here is a second, more substantial example. During the march along the Black Sea, Xenophon is called upon to deliver a speech in reply to an ambassador who had come to the Ten Thousand to demand that they cease harming a certain city of the Pontos. The ambassador threatened to go to war (5.5.13ff). Xenophon replies in kind. He warns the ambassador that the Ten Thousand have hitherto treated as enemies all those who have failed to open markets for them (as the city in question was doing). They have done this out of necessity, not hubris, because they had to have provisions. To give

³⁴ The passage is *Memorabilia* 3.1.7–11. There, Socrates compares a well-crafted speech to both a well-built house and a well-ordered army. To acquire a useful house, he says, you should use the strongest materials for the foundations and for the roof (i.e., rock and clay), while the weaker materials, which rot and wear away (i.e., wood and brick), are best used for the middle parts. Likewise, a general should put his best troops at the front and at the back of his army and leave his weaker troops in the middle so that they are led by the ones and pushed by the others. Socrates goes on to suggest, in the passage in which the MSS. diverge, that this principle applies not only to well-built houses and well-ordered armies but to well-crafted speeches as well: the weaker material should always be put "in the middle" (3.1.11. The reading "LEGEIN," which I believe is authentic, is found in five different MSS. See the apparatus of Hude [1985].)

teeth to this not-so-veiled threat, Xenophon names three "very frightening" tribes that the Ten Thousand successively treated as enemies and defeated during their retreat: "the Kardouchoi, the Taochoi, and the Chaldeans" (5.5.17). Yet the narrative of book four describes the centrally placed Taochoi as extremely feeble and almost unarmed (4.7.1–14 esp. §5).³⁵ Xenophon's speech is once again weak at the center. Here is a third example. In a speech delivered later in the book, Xenophon tries to persuade the army to campaign with, and become the paid mercenaries of, a Thracian chieftain named Seuthēs instead of obeying the Lacedaemonian governor of Byzantium. The governor wanted the Ten Thousand to repair to a region of the Pontos known as the Chersonese. But Xenophon thought that the proposal of Seuthēs was much better in the circumstances (7.2.15). To persuade the soldiers of this, Xenophon recalls a series of three crimes perpetrated by the Lacedaemonian governor against them (7.3.3). Yet the second and central crime—the Greeks had been cheated out of their wages—had been perpetrated by another man. The governor had had nothing to do with it!³⁶ Xenophon thus slanders the governor of Byzantium—admittedly, a thuggish man—at the center of his speech. He does so to help overcome the soldiers' resistance. A fourth example occurs earlier in the *Anabasis*, where Xenophon tries to persuade the captains of Proxenos to fight an all-out war against the Persians and abandon any thought of negotiating with the faithless King. They must expect the worst, Xenophon warns, if they ever come into the King's power. He gives three reasons to expect this. The second and central reason is this: since the Greeks campaigned against the King to make him a slave and to kill him, if they could, they would be shown no quarter (3.1.17–18).³⁷ But Xenophon states explicitly (in his narrative) that the Greeks campaigned with Cyrus *without knowing* of his imperial ambitions. When they discovered these ambitions, they followed him out of *shame* (Xenophon stresses) not in order to enslave or kill the King (3.1.10). The speech of Xenophon thus exaggerates, at the center, the culpability of the Ten Thousand. It does so to nip in the bud the dangerous temptation to try to appease the King (3.1.10). Lastly, as a fifth example, recall that the speech in which Xenophon proposes to the soldiers to maintain a guard around the camp even though the army has reached the Black Sea—a proposal silently rejected by the soldiers—is

³⁵ The Kardouchoi and the Chaldeans are described as warlike: 4.3.2, 4.3.4.

³⁶ The crime had been perpetrated, not by the Lacedaemonian governor Aristarchos but by the Lacedaemonian admiral Anaxibios. Xenophon also considers three options in that speech. To follow the chieftain Seuthēs (and disobey Aristarchos) is the second and central option.

³⁷ Xenophon also states his reasons by means of a succession of three rhetorical questions.

the third of five proposals put up for a vote that day. Xenophon's powers of persuasion actually fail him at the center (5.1.5–14).

I will uncover dozens of examples of the use of "the center" in this study. Taken together, they will prove that Xenophon uses this technique in his speeches. But I wish to make two additional points here. First, if readers remain unconvinced that Xenophon employs the technique in question, I ask them to keep an open mind. I grant that the examples adduced hitherto do not yet prove my case. But I hope that they will suffice to foster an openness toward the *possibility* that I may be right. Second, I contend that this technique is used by Xenophon not only in his speeches but also in his narratives: after all, the narratives are speeches, too—aimed at the reader. And just as he does in his speeches, Xenophon uses "the center" to call attention to the weaknesses of his arguments or to indicate where his hopeful depiction of the political world may fall short. A single example must suffice here. The "baddie" Menōn is the only Greek general seized by the King and *not* executed by him. He is also the third of the five generals eulogized (or censured) by Xenophon (2.6). I believe that Menōn occupies this central position because he embodies a challenge to ordinary piety and morality. Though he deserves the title of "arch-baddie" of the *Anabasis*, Menōn "succeeds" where others, such as the noble Proxenos, fail. The central placement of Menōn thus calls attention to his survival. This survival in turn forces us to wonder whether Xenophon, the Socratic King, is able to combine the nobility of Proxenos with the "effectiveness" of Menōn. Can he cut a path between the Charybdis of noble failure and the Scylla of criminal success? The rhetorical technique of "the center" thus points toward the question of the *Anabasis*.

3. Xenophon's Manner of Writing: The Manuscripts of the *Anabasis*

Some literary devices used by Xenophon are best discussed in connection with the manuscript tradition of the *Anabasis*.³⁸ The text has come down to us in about fifteen manuscripts divided into two families: the Paris family, whose main representatives are MSS. B, A, E, and above all C; and the Italian family, whose main representatives are today thought to be MSS. F and M. Though the Italian family is slightly older,³⁹ philologists

³⁸ On the manuscript tradition, see the useful discussion of Masqueray (1930), pp. 29–40, to which I am indebted.

³⁹ MSS. FM are from the twelfth century (or the early thirteenth century in the case of M). MS. C was copied in 1320. But according to Masqueray (1930), C is from an archetype

(till the early twentieth century) regarded the Paris family as superior and the MSS. belonging to it were known as the *meliores*. MS. C, the best and most important of the group, was the basis for several major textual editions. In 1903, however, this near-scholarly consensus was shattered by the discovery of a papyrus at *Oxyrhynchus* believed to date back to the second or third-century AD and containing a portion of the *Anabasis* (P. Oxy III, 463).⁴⁰ In those passages where the two families of MSS. diverge, the papyrus agrees with the Italian family with somewhat greater frequency than with the Paris family.⁴¹ Since this papyrus is believed to antedate all extant MSS. by about a millennium, philologists started to accord greater weight to the Italian family because of the manifest antiquity of some of its variants.⁴² Later editors have treated the two families more evenly. Hude/Peters (1972) even give something of a preference to the Italian family (FM) in several places.

My study of the variants of the *Anabasis* has convinced me that the older view held by Dindorf, Gemoll, and other philologists is the correct view. The best manuscript of the *Anabasis* is *Parisinus* 1640 (C).⁴³ Speaking generally, it must be acknowledged that MS. C is often "bumpier" than MSS. FM. This is so, however, because MSS. FM systematically expunge from the *Anabasis* textual pointers or "bumps" that are both grammatically possible and suggestive of important possibilities of interpretation. All too often, modern philologists, fortified by the evidence of the papyri, have followed FM and relegated these "bumps" to their *apparata*. But they should not have accorded so much weight to the papyri. Even *Oxyrhynchus* 463, by far the longest extant papyrus of the work, contains less than 1 percent of the *Anabasis*. It is simply impossible on such a slim basis to determine the merits of the manuscript which the fragment was once a part of. Besides, we should not confuse antiquity with merit. Chance played a crucial role in the preservation of any given papyrus.

To restore the position that MS. C is the best manuscript of the *Anabasis* and that we should depart from its readings with much caution, I now

of the ninth century (p. 30). There is some disagreement about the age of MS. F. Bizon (1972) thinks that it dates back to the second half of the tenth century (Vol. 1, p. lv).

⁴⁰ For the text of all the papyri of the *Anabasis*, see Paap (1970). *Oxyrhynchus* 463 contains *Anabasis* VI. 6.9–10, 15–24.

⁴¹ According to Paap (1970), the papyrus agrees five times with the Italian family but only three times with the Paris family (p. 11).

⁴² Also, consider the inscription at 5.3 *in fine*. The epigraphic evidence is discussed by Masqueray (p. 36, note 2).

⁴³ It is a view also held by Hug (1886) and even Masqueray (1930). Where MS. C has been corrected, the view of Gemoll should be followed: the corrected version (known as C1 by Masqueray and as C2 by Hude/Peters) is almost always superior.

examine an important literary technique employed by Xenophon that is preserved almost exclusively in MS. C (and in the MSS. of the Paris family). It is a technique I shall call "renaming." Given that modern editors of the *Anabasis*, including such champions of C as Dindorf and Gemoll, have followed the inferior MSS. over C in this regard, we can say that the technique in question has been overlooked for at least two hundred years, perhaps much longer.

iv) *Renaming Men, Rivers, and Mountains:* *The Primacy of Manuscript C*

Xenophon frequently gives new names to men, rivers, and mountains in the *Anabasis*—he renames them—to produce a variety of literary effects, including humor and the enhancement of the beauty of his work. In some cases, he employs renaming to convey pointers to his philosophic argument. I saw a first glimmer of the technique of renaming as I was reading a speech in which Xenophon rebukes the Ten Thousand for their lawless and shameful behavior (5.7.13–33). Xenophon recounts how a group of soldiers had hunted down a market supervisor named ZĒLARCHOS, who was apparently liberal with his whip (ZĒLOS-ARCHEIN: "zealous-ruler"). The soldiers had complained that ZĒLARCHOS was treating them most terribly (5.7.23). Fearing for his life—the soldiers now wanted to lapidate him—ZĒLARCHOS had fled the army. Xenophon deplores this flight: if ZĒLARCHOS was guilty, he has now escaped with impunity; if he was innocent, he has been wronged. But as he refers to the now-departed ZĒLARCHOS, Xenophon calls him by the name "TĒLARCHOS": that is, "Far-Away Ruler" (TĒLE-ARCHEIN: 5.7.29). This funny reading occurs in all (but one) of the MSS. of the Paris family (CBA), and not in FM or in any of the inferior MSS. (These MSS. show the "correct" reading ZĒLARCHOS.) But is it so difficult to believe that Xenophon kept his sense of humor even as he chastised the soldiers? No modern editor of the *Anabasis* has printed the reading.⁴⁴

But (it will be objected) the reading "TĒLARCHOS" is probably the work of a droll scribe. Moreover, since a single letter separates "TĒLARCHOS" from "ZĒLARCHOS," textual corruption provides an alternative explanation. Is there any evidence that the practice of renaming extends beyond this one small example? The evidence is overwhelming, and, taken cumulatively, it amounts to a proof that Xenophon uses the literary technique in question. In the first book of the *Anabasis*,

⁴⁴ On the use of TĒLE, consider the renaming of the TĒLEBOA ("far-sounding-river"; TĒLE-BOAŌ) at 4.4.3.

for instance, Xenophon refers to a Persian named ARTAPATĒS, who was the most faithful of Cyrus's scepter bearers (1.8.28). ARTAPATĒS also acted as Cyrus's henchman. Hence, ARTAPATĒS was once assigned the task of doing away with a high-ranking Persian who had betrayed Cyrus. ARTAPATĒS did such an effective job that "no one ever saw [the traitor] again, alive or dead, nor could anyone say with knowledge how he died. [...] No tomb of his was ever found" (1.6.11). As he writes this, Xenophon dubs the henchman in question "ARTAPOU": that is, "He-Who-Butchers-[Someone]-Somewhere" (ARTAMOS-POU; MSS. CBA).⁴⁵ In this case, the "renaming" entails a couple of letters, which, if MS. corruption is to be the explanation, would have had to drop from three different MSS.⁴⁶

Xenophon's practice of renaming people extends to the non-Persians. In his first major speech to the army, he tells the troops that even if it should prove impossible to return to Hellas, they could still settle somewhere in the Persian empire. A few barbaric tribes were dwelling profitably in those parts, including a tribe that the Ten Thousand had defeated on their way to Babylon and whose territory they had plundered. The tribesmen in question were known as the "LUKAONAS"—the High and Mighty "Wolf-People" (1.2.19, LUKOS). In his speech, however, Xenophon renames them: they become the "LUKARNAS"—the less-than-mighty "Wolf-Sheep-People" (3.2.23: LUKOS-ARNOS, MSS. FA and C [corrector's hand]).⁴⁷ Later in the retreat, the Greeks march through the uplands of Armenia during the winter and suffer bitterly from cold and hunger. They reach some local villages. A gallant Athenian captain named POLUKRATĒS captures one of these villages, thereby providing food and drink for the starving soldiers. "POLUKRATĒS" means "Much-Strength" (POLUS-KRATOS). Xenophon renames him POLUBŌTĒS—"Feeder-Of-Many" (POLUS-BOSKŌ, MSS. CBE: 4.5.23–24).⁴⁸ Not long after that, the Greeks conscript an Armenian village chief to serve as their guide. To ensure the man's faithfulness,

⁴⁵ ARTAMOS ("butcher") is a rare word, but Xenophonic: *Education of Cyrus* 2.2.4. It is listed among Xenophon's dorisms by Gautier (1911, p. 36).

⁴⁶ It is true that MSS. B and A are thought to be copies of C. Yet they often disagree in the spelling of names.

⁴⁷ Gautier (1911) points out that Xenophon apparently coined the verb "LUKOŪSTHAI" ("to-be-eaten-by-a-wolf"), a *hapax legomena* found at *Education of Cyrus* 8.3.41 (p. 153–54). According to Strabo (2000), the plain of Lukaonia was teeming with sheep (12.6.1). On the opposition between "wolf" and "sheep," see *Memorabilia* 2.7.13–14. The LUKAONAS are also mentioned at *Education of Cyrus* 6.2.10, but without any renaming.

⁴⁸ "BŌTIANEIRA" (= BOSKŌ-ANĒR) at *Iliad* 1.155 is a parallel case of the lengthening of the omicron in POLUBŌTĒS.

they hold his pubescent son captive and entrust his guard to a captain named EPISTHENĒS (4.6.1–3). EPISTHENĒS was a fine soldier and a decent man. But he was a pederast. Xenophon calls him in this context KLEISTHENĒS—"The-Mighty-Door-Shutter": he kept a close watch over the boy (KLEIŌ-STENOS, MS. BE, *though not C*).⁴⁹ Later on, as Xenophon complains to the Greek soldiers of their wild and shameful behavior, he tells the story of a captain named KLEARETOS, whose lawless actions had caused much grief (5.7.13ff). KLEARETOS means "The-Fame-Of-Virtue" (KLEOS-ARETĒ); Xenophon calls him twice KLEARATOS—"The-Infamy-Of-The-Accursed" (5.7.14, 16: KLEOS-ARATOS, MSS. CBAE).

Xenophon also renames landmarks such as rivers and mountains, and here comes into view the most important function of renaming. Interpreters of the *Anabasis* have long struggled to decipher Xenophon's geography. Already in the nineteenth century, the traveler W. F. Ainsworth complained that the task of determining the path of the retreat of the Ten Thousand was a "most perplexing subject" because several landmarks mentioned by Xenophon bore names found in no other earlier source, such as Herodotus.⁵⁰ The cause of Xenophon's singularity in naming, however, has never been stated: Xenophon simply coins new names to provide guidance, not to his geography, but to his *logos*, his philosophic argument. He enlists toponymy in the service of philosophy.⁵¹ One interesting example of this practice occurs in book two. As the Greeks retreat in Mesopotamia under a precarious truce with the Persians, they reach a large river, which the inferior MSS. call the "ZABATON," that is, "The-Easily-Fordable-River" (ZA-BATOS, MSS. FM, 2.5.1). And indeed, when the Greeks cross this river, they do so with ease (3.3.6). But since the Lacedaemonian general Klearchos and his fellow Greeks are ensnared by the Persians on the banks of the river,

⁴⁹ Xenophon uses the verb KLEIŌ three times to refer to the locking of a gate in the *Anabasis*: 5.5.19, 6.2.8, 7.1.36. He may also have been thinking of the notorious Athenian pederast by the same name: see, for example, Aristophanes's *Clouds* 355. The adjective AKLEISTOS ("unlocked") occurs at *Education of Cyrus* 7.5.25.

⁵⁰ (1875) p. 266. Larcher (1778) already complains of this difficulty.

⁵¹ M.-F. Baslez (1995) observes: "Mais on trouve aussi dans l'*Anabase* des créations grecques à valeur descriptive pour les fleuves jusque-là inconnus du Moyen-Euphrate et d'Arménie: ainsi Téléobas [sic], le « Rugissant » (*Anab.*, IV.4.3 [...] ou Physkos (*Anab.*, II.4.25) l'« Enflé » [...] (p. 80). But Baslez misunderstands the significance of this observation. She goes on to ascribe the practice of renaming to Xenophon's intellectual laziness, that is, to his lack of interest in "enquêtes de type toponymiques" (p. 83). Along the same lines is Kuhrt (1995): "Xenophon's handling of geographical names in 'the east' is altogether odd [...] and belongs to a discourse not helpful for understanding topographical realities [...]" (p. 243). But what is not helpful topographically is helpful philosophically.

Xenophon chooses to rename it. According to the better MSS., he calls it "ZAPATAN"—"The-River-of-the-Big-Fraud" (ZA-APATAŌ, MSS. CB: 2.5.1)⁵²—a name befitting the egregious Persian deception. Interestingly, the same river receives yet another name a little later in the book, *after* Xenophon has described the deception of the Persians and the grave error of judgment of Klearchos, which led to his death and that of many others (2.5). Xenophon calls the river by the name "ZATĒN"—"The-River-of-the-Big-(God-Induced)-Madness" (ZA-ATĒ, MSS. FMBC [corrector's hand]: 3.3.6).⁵³ No modern editor of the *Anabasis* has dared to print this reading though it is found in all the MSS.⁵⁴ Yet the name, which must go back to Xenophon, provides a pointer to the cause of Klearchos's misguided attempt to become the "friend" of the Persian Tissaphernēs. As I will show in chapter two, the name suggests that Klearchos's error of judgment had a pious-moral cause.⁵⁵ He was made "mad" by the gods.

Having reached this point, we see that we must always wonder why Xenophon names people or landmarks the way he does, especially when the names are odd or without precedent.⁵⁶ For example, why does he call a tribe of the Pontos the "Drilai," a name otherwise unknown (5.2)? Why does he call an affluent of the Tigris the "Kentritēs" (4.3)?⁵⁷ Why does he call two different rivers by the same name ("Phasis"), though he obviously knew at the time of writing the *Anabasis* that they were different rivers (4.6.4; 5.6.36, 5.7.1, §5, §9)?

⁵² The prefix ZA has two distinct meanings. It can mean (in Aeolic Greek) DIA-; thus, ZABATOS = DIABATOS. But it can also mean "very," as in ZATHEOS ("very divine") or ZAKOTOS ("very angry"). Hence, "ZAPATAN" means "very deceiving." The verb APATAŌ ("to deceive") is used frequently by Xenophon in the *Anabasis*—no fewer than nine times in the first part of a single speech (5.7.5–12)—but always in the compound EX-APATAŌ ("to deceive thoroughly").

⁵³ On ATĒ, the divinity that "blindeth all," see *Iliad* 19.85–138. Zeus is said to have expelled ATĒ from Olympus. She is compared to Eros by Agathon in Plato's *Symposium*, not only because they both induce madness, but above all because they both dwell among men (195d2–5).

⁵⁴ The first (uncorrected) hand of C gives EZOTĒN.

⁵⁵ It did not have a politico-military cause, as Grote (1900) Vol. 9, p. 74 argues.

⁵⁶ The Xenophonic Socrates suggests explicitly that proper names are pregnant with meaning, at least in Homer. Consider Socrates's admittedly fanciful etymology of "Ganumēdes" at *Symposium* 8.30—Even names that are *not* coined by Xenophon can acquire a special significance under his pen. In chapter five, for example, I discuss the case of a tribe called the "Mossunoikoi" ("the-wooden-house-dwellers": MOSSUN-OÏKOS, 5.4). Though the name "Mossunoikoi" occurs in Herodotus (3.94, 7.78), Xenophon infuses it with a significance that bears on the *logos* of the *Anabasis*: "the Mossunoikoi" are literary stand-ins for "the Socratics."

⁵⁷ The name is found in later writers such as Diodorus Siculus (2000): 14.27.7.

I will explain these and other instances of renaming in the body of my study. For now, I must limit myself to three observations. First, of the eight instances of renaming described in this subsection, all but one are preserved in MS. C. (The exception is EPISTHENĒS.) Only two such instances are preserved in MS. F (LUKARNAS and ZATĒN) and MS. M preserves a single one (ZATĒN). This pattern constitutes strong *prima facie* evidence of the quality and reliability of MS. C. It shows that the smoothness and seamlessness of FM is rather a sign of the inferiority of these MSS. than of their quality and reliability.

Second, modern editors of the *Anabasis* have printed the readings of MSS. FM over those of MS. C in all but one of these instances.⁵⁸ Indeed, not infrequently, the readings of MS. C are not even listed in the *critica apparatus*.⁵⁹ To be sure, some of these instances of renaming could stem from scribal interference or MS. corruption. This possibility cannot be disproved and should not be discarded too quickly. Yet the sheer number of probable instances shows that the technique of renaming goes back to Xenophon. In my opinion, an enduring prejudice against the intellectual and literary abilities of our author is what explains how so many excellent philologists and classicists overlooked during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries what are often manifest instances of Xenophonic artfulness or playfulness.⁶⁰

In the third place, the most famous scene of the *Anabasis*—the sighting of the Black Sea from atop Mount Thēchēs—benefits from being read through the lenses of renaming. The name "Mount Thēchēs," accepted by all modern editors, is found only in the inferior MSS. and

⁵⁸ The universal exception is "ZAPATAN," which is printed by Dindorf (1855), Marchant (1904), Gemoll (1909), Masqueray (1930), Hude/Peters (1972), and others. The choice is never explained.

⁵⁹ Marchant (1904), for example, does not list "LUKARNAS" or "KLEISTHENĒS." Gemoll (1909) omits "LUKARNAS," "KLEISTHENĒS," and "KLEARATOS."

⁶⁰ The existence of the technique of renaming is supported by the findings of Léopold Gautier (1911), the best student of the language of Xenophon, who, though he takes no cognizance of the technique *per se*, shows through many examples that Xenophon was strongly inclined to compose and derive new words: "Mais [Xénophon] appartient à cette classe d'écrivains qui en usent très librement avec la langue, qui ne connaissent point les affres du style, parce qu'ils estiment que la langue est au service de l'écrivain, et non l'écrivain sous la domination de la langue. Telle était son attitude. Les libertés qu'il prend en témoignent hautement; il use des mots les plus spéciaux ou même de vocables étrangers; surtout il ne se gêne pas pour composer et dériver des mots à sa convenance" (p. 143, emphasis added. See also pp. 153–54). The technique of renaming is not limited to the *Anabasis*. The reader may consider, for example, the case of Aglaitadas, the dour and pious Persian, enemy of laughter (*Education of Cyrus*, 2.2.11 ff). According to one reliable but unfortunately incomplete MS. (F), Aglaitadas is once renamed "Agalitadas." "Agalitadas" is there taking offense at Cyrus's irreverent laughter: 2.2.11.

has no discernable meaning.⁶¹ According to the better MSS., however, the mountain in question is called "Mount Êchēs:" that is, "Mount-Of-The-Roar." ÊCHĒ (the genitive of which is ÊCHĒS) is a poetic word employed by Homer to refer to the roar of the sea in particular.⁶² The name "Mount Êchēs" is thus a beautiful way to memorialize the roar of Ten Thousand tearful men as they gaze upon the horizon—"The Sea! The Sea!" (4.7.21–27).⁶³

v) *Emending the Manuscripts*

Given the quality of MS. C⁶⁴ (and the Paris MSS. generally), editors of the *Anabasis* must be careful when they propose to emend them. In this subsection, I discuss a pair of instances where emendations have gained wide currency. My purpose is not philological, however. I seek to shed further light on literary techniques employed by Xenophon to convey his thought between the lines.

* * *

In the third book of the *Anabasis*, the Ten Thousand are in full retreat in Mesopotamia and are marching northward on the eastern banks of the Tigris. Xenophon describes how they skirmish with the Persians and their leader, the satrap Tissaphernēs:

When [Tissaphernēs] came near, he stationed some of his units behind the Greeks, and he led others alongside them, opposite their flanks, but he did not dare to charge nor did he wish to hazard all, but he ordered his men to discharge their slings and to let fly their arrows. But when the Rhodians [i.e., the slingers of the Greeks], who had been put in battle order, discharged their slings and the *Scythian archers* [i.e., the archers of

⁶¹ As early as Larcher (1778), the mountain is called Thēchēs.

⁶² *Iliad* 2.209.

⁶³ I disregard the varying accents and breathings found in the better MSS., which are the guesswork of later scribes. These literary aids were not in use before the third or second century BC (pace Thompson [1912] pp. 61–62 and Reynolds and Wilson [1991] p. 4).

⁶⁴ Of course, I am not suggesting that MS. C is "perfect." Among other blemishes, it contains several apparent short lacunae (e.g., 3.4.33, 5.2.11, 6.6.20, 6.6.28, 7.1.35, 7.3.38, 7.7.24, 7.7.39) many of which seem to have been caused by a *saut du même au même*. One lacuna is more extensive and significant (4.1.2–4). It is filled by the inferior MSS. as well as by MS. A of the Paris family. The lacunae are less frequent in the first four books of MS. C since it was corrected with a (lost) MS. that must have been excellent. Indeed, the primacy of MS. C is less pronounced in the last three books of the *Anabasis* because it was either not corrected, or corrected with inferior MSS. (see Masqueray pp. 30–31).

the Greeks] let fly their arrows and no one missed his man—even if one were very eager, it would not have been easy to miss—Tissaphernēs very quickly retreated out of range and the other units retreated as well. For the rest of the day, [the Greeks] marched, and the [Persians] followed. (3.4.14–15, my emphasis)

Scholars have been baffled by the reference to "Scythian archers" in this passage (SKUTHAI TOXOTAI). There is no other mention of "Scythians" in the *Anabasis* (but cf. 4.7.18, 4.8.1). The only archers we ever see fighting on the Greek side are Cretans (1.2.9, 3.3.7, 3.3.15, 3.4.17; also 4.2.28). To resolve this difficulty it has been suggested that since the Scythians were famous for their ability to shoot their bows while riding, "Scythian archers" must have been a synonym for "mounted archers." But the argument is weak. The Greeks could barely piece together a cavalry of fifty horses in the beginning of the retreat. They had neither the riders nor the horses needed to organize a body of mounted archers (3.3.19–20). Besides, Xenophon does not refer to mounted archers in the *Anabasis* (cf. 3.3.6 ff). He *does* refer to such archers in the *Education of Cyrus* and in the *Memorabilia*. In both places he uses the customary word—HIPPOTOXOTĒS (5.3.24, 3.3.1). C. G. Krüger (1849) thus deleted "Scythian" as an interpolation and has been followed by modern editors.⁶⁵ But is there no way to make sense of the MSS. reading?

According to LSJ (s.v. "SKUTHĒS"), the Scythians were renowned in Antiquity for something beside their skills as archers. They were notorious for mutilating the bodies of slain enemies, so much so that the primary meaning of "SKUTHIDZEIN" ("to behave like a Scythian") was "scalping."⁶⁶ Tellingly, Xenophon alludes to these so-called "Scythians" in the wake of mentioning that the Greeks had mutilated some Persian cadavers two days earlier in an attempt to scare off pursuers (3.4.5). This deed, though perhaps understandable in the circumstances, was an impious act from the point of view of Hellenic law.⁶⁷ Xenophon does not state, however, who among "the Greeks" had committed the crime (3.4.5). But by speaking of the "Scythian archers," he intimates the truth: the culprits were the Cretans, the only archers ever mentioned by him.⁶⁸

⁶⁵ He has been followed by Gemoll, Hug, Marchant, and Masqueray. Dindorf and Hude/Peters print the MSS. reading.

⁶⁶ Herodotus describes vividly how the Scythians treated the bodies of slain enemies: 4.64–65.

⁶⁷ The transgression occurs right before the diptych "Larissa-Mespila" (3.4.7–12). One purpose of that diptych is to indicate whether the transgression of the Hellenic law by the "Scythians" was likely to be punished by the divine. See chapter three, pp. 144–47.

⁶⁸ The Cretans are mentioned in the immediate vicinity of the "Scythians": cf. 3.4.17 with 3.4.15.

By renaming the Cretans, he manages to soften his censure. Why does he not blame the Cretans openly? Because he remembered their gallantry. In the perilous mountains of Kardouchia, they would soon distinguish themselves and prove most useful to the army (4.2.28). Xenophon softens his censure to pay tribute to their dedication and skill.⁶⁹ This is a fine instance of his remembering the good things more than the bad. But since he wishes to convey the truth, he intimates the sin of the Cretans, quietly but with perfect clarity.

The most significant case of a widely accepted but dubious emendation pertains to the summaries affixed to each of the books of the *Anabasis* after the first.⁷⁰ In these passages, Xenophon gives a summary of the previous book (or books) as a preface to the next stage of his *logos*. Before the nineteenth century, scholars did not seriously doubt the authenticity of these summaries. Diogenes Laertius already refers to them in the second or third century.⁷¹ Philologists such as Bisschop and Cobet were the first to impugn their authenticity in the nineteenth century. Later editors, including Hug (1886), Marchant (1904), Masqueray (1930), and Hude/Peters (1972), began to bracket them. Gemoll (1909) put them in his footnotes. He was imitated by Brownson (1922), editor of the Loeb *Anabasis*, whose editorial decision was reaffirmed when his translation was revised in 1998. At present, only one English translation—by Ambler (2008)—preserves the summaries. The others omit the summaries without noting the omission. For the Greekless readers, they never existed.

Remarkably, no arguments are ever adduced to justify this editorial license.⁷² It is apparently believed or assumed that the summaries are unnecessary since they repeat what the reader already knows. They must be mnemonic devices added by a later hand. Yet the summaries do not repeat what the reader already knows. An important counterexample is the summary affixed to book four. There, Xenophon explains why the Greeks decided to march north and into the dangerous mountains of Kardouchia when they met geographic obstacles that stopped their advance along the eastern bank of the Tigris (4.1.1–4). To be sure, the account *appears* to be repetitive since Xenophon gives an account of the same decision at the end of book three (3.5.14–18). Yet if we compare

⁶⁹ Cf., however, 5.2.28–32.

⁷⁰ 2.1.1, 3.1.1, 4.1.1–4, 5.1.1, 7.1.1.

⁷¹ (1995). The reference is at 2.57.

⁷² Consider, for example, Brownson/Dillery (1998): "All these summaries must have been the work of a late editor" (p. 146, note 1). It should be noted, however, that a part of the summary affixed to the fourth book is missing in all the better MSS. except A. Book six does not have any summary (see, however, 6.3.1 in MSS. FM). I explain this anomaly at the beginning of chapter six.

these two accounts in the un-emended texts of the MSS., crucial differences become evident. Most importantly, in the initial account (book three), the generals hear *privately* from local captives that the northern road will be extremely difficult: the Kardouchoi who live in the mountains are warlike and once destroyed a Persian army of 120,000 men.⁷³ Despite this, the generals think it necessary to go north: there is no viable alternative in the circumstances. When he "repeats" himself, Xenophon writes that *the soldiers* think that they ought to go north (4.1.2).⁷⁴ ("Necessity" is not mentioned in the "repeated" account.) The "repeated" account thus contains the explanation of why the troops agree with the generals. Not surprisingly, it is silent about the difficulties disclosed privately to the generals at the end of book three, especially the warlike character of the Kardouchoi. Instead, the soldiers hear from some captives an optimistic report about how the sources of the Tigris can be easily crossed or circumvented once the army gets beyond Kardouchia and reaches Armenia (4.1.3).⁷⁵ A conclusion seems inescapable: the generals allowed the captives to spread about an overly hopeful report about the northern road to avoid further discouraging the soldiers.⁷⁶ Far from being redundant, the summary of book four illustrates how the technique of "repetition" is used to analyze when truthfulness is consistent with prudent rule. Once again, "repetitions" are employed by Xenophon to explore the question of the noble and the good.⁷⁷

4. Recent Scholarship on the *Anabasis*

The writings of Xenophon have been the object of a resurgence of scholarly interest in the last twenty-five years. Initially ignored by this

⁷³ According to the best MSS., the generals also hear that even if they should march through Kardouchia and reach the "large and happy" land of Armenia, they will find it "very difficult" (APOROS: MSS. CAEB1, 3.5.17) to get beyond Armenia. The inferior MSS. FM read "very easy" (EUPOROS) instead of "very difficult" for that passage. The reading of the best MSS. accords with the later sufferings of the Greeks in Armenia: 4.4–4.5. On the Persians' enduring problems with the Kardouchoi, see *Hellenika* 2.1.13.

⁷⁴ The emendation of Leonclavius, from STRATIŌTAIS ("soldiers") to STRATĒGOIS ("generals") at 4.1.2, accepted by all modern editors, is without any MS. support.

⁷⁵ In the event, the crossing of the river "Kentritēs," which lies on the border between Kardouchia and Armenia, will prove to require the audacity of Xenophon: see chapter four, section 1 subsection ii), as well as 4.4.3.

⁷⁶ Note how Xenophon vouches for the veracity of a single one of the statements that "were said" by the captives to the soldiers: 4.1.3 *in fine*.

⁷⁷ For a powerful linguistic argument in support of the authenticity of the summaries, see Hoeg (1950) pp. 162–64. In particular, Hoeg states: "En effet, prétendre que les résumés sont dus à Xénophon, c'est prétendre que la division en livres est xénophontéenne, ou

movement, the *Anabasis* has been studied in several monographs more recently. With one partial exception, however, these recent books do not treat the *Anabasis* as a work of political philosophy, let alone as a study in Socratic rule and an introduction to philosophy.

Robin Waterfield's *Xenophon's Retreat: Greece, Persia and the End of the Golden Age* (2006)⁷⁸ aims "to present a rounded version of the story of the expedition [of the Ten Thousand]" and to explore various aspects of it not developed by Xenophon, such as "the gruesome nature of ancient battle" (xii, xi). Waterfield also seeks to show that the expedition of the Ten Thousand (and Xenophon's account of it) is a turning point in Greek history: it marks a "retreat from a golden age of optimism" of fifth century BC to the "realistic disenchantment" characteristic of the fourth (192). Waterfield's book is written gracefully and offers several curious observations about the geography of the land through which the army of the Ten Thousand made its famous march. (Waterfield retraced a portion of this route "in the comfort of a modern Land Rover" [144].) Yet his account of the *Anabasis*, aimed at a general audience, is introductory. It largely consists of paraphrases of the work in which Xenophon disappears for surprisingly long stretches. When he is mentioned, Xenophon emerges as a capable but somewhat conventional leader who "never questioned the religion of his youth" and remained prisoner to such dubious prejudices as pro-Spartan sympathies (42). Xenophon's interest in Socrates—and the education he received from Socrates—are not significantly treated. Never would we guess from this book that Xenophon wrote four Socratic works. Moreover, while Waterfield expresses admiration for Xenophon's literary gifts—"At his best, Xenophon is an outstanding writer and a great storyteller" (186)—he gives little evidence of being aware of his peculiar manner of writing, which conveys so much between the lines. Xenophon's rhetoric is simply not investigated in this monograph.

In contrast to Waterfield, John W. I. Lee writes *A Greek Army on the March: Soldiers and Survival in Xenophon's Anabasis* (2007)⁷⁹ for the academic historian rather than the lay public. The monograph paints a picture of the military experience of the Ten Thousand and, more generally, of the Greek mercenary soldier in the fifth and fourth centuries BC. Following an approach developed by John Keegan, a military historian of note, Lee

mieux—pour éviter d'être dupe des mots—c'est prétendre que Xénophon, au moment où il donna son texte aux copistes, en marqua nettement les coupes, probablement en leur enjoignant simplement et sévèrement de respecter la répartition en 7 rouleaux." As for the summaries themselves, "Rien ne nous autorise à en douter de l'authenticité [sic]" (p. 164). Erbse (2010) also contends that the Xenophonic origin of the summaries is clear (p. 480).

⁷⁸ Harvard University Press, 248 pages.

⁷⁹ Cambridge University Press, 323 pages.

seeks to "examine battle through the soldier's rather than the general's eyes"; readers are invited "to imagine the physical and spatial dimensions of ordinary soldiers' worlds" (5, 276). Lee's careful study thus explores in an extremely thorough fashion the daily routine of the Greek soldier—from how he marched, provisioned, and made fire, to issues of sanitation, hygiene, and sexual relations. Lee believes that scholarly readings of the *Anabasis* have tended to "view events solely through political eyes" (10). To counteract this tendency, he focuses on the purely military, not to say the mundane. His monograph is filled with accounts of curious practices or customs that will be of interest to the historically minded. Yet in his quest to transcend politics and the political arena—as well as the perspective of rulers—Lee's account evacuates all issues of leadership. The army he depicts is an army without a head, so to speak. Xenophon is absent from this monograph. It is as if he had no share in saving the Ten Thousand. Thus the book sheds no light on Xenophon's conception of rule. It is a study in social organization, not a study in leadership. We cannot be surprised that the name of Socrates does not occur in it (cf. 97, 273).

Vivienne J. Gray's *Xenophon's Mirror of Princes: Reading the Reflections* (2011)⁸⁰ is a more ambitious book than either Waterfield's or Lee's. Her intent is to develop a comprehensive account of Xenophon's "theory of leadership" through a study of his entire corpus, including the *Anabasis* (2, 7 and *passim*). Gray also examines various methods employed by Xenophon to portray leaders so as to gain insights into his "general literary techniques" (1). In the process, she develops a sustained critique of what she variously calls "darker," "subversive," or "ironical" readings of Xenophon—readings such as those developed by Christopher Nadon,⁸¹ Christopher Tuplin,⁸² W. E. Higgins,⁸³ or James Tatum⁸⁴—which have discovered "concealed criticism behind [the] apparently positive images of leadership in the majority of [Xenophon's] works" (1). Reacting against this scholarly tendency, which she traces back to Leo Strauss, Gray sets out to develop what she calls "innocent" or "positive" readings of Xenophon; in such readings, "[Xenophon] means to praise and

⁸⁰ Oxford University Press, 405 pages.

⁸¹ *Xenophon's Prince: Republic and Empire in the Cyropaedia* (Berkeley: University of Berkeley Press) 2001, 198 pages.

⁸² *The Failings of Empire: A Reading of Xenophon, Hellenika 2.3.11–7.5.27* (Stuttgart: F. Steiner) 1993, 264 pages.

⁸³ *Xenophon the Athenian: The Problem of the Individual and the Society of the Polis* (New York: SUNY Press) 1977, 183 pages.

⁸⁴ *Xenophon's Imperial Fiction: On the Education of Cyrus* (Princeton: Princeton University Press) 1989, 328 pages.

blame what he seems to praise and blame" (2, 25 note 29, 117–18). In other words, Gray argues for "the transparency of his messages" (118). She is adamant that Xenophon does *not* convey his thoughts between the lines because this kind of rhetoric is subversive and would turn him into "a man of monumentally modern cynicism," bent on "systematically destroy[ing] seeming virtue and uncover[ing] hidden vice" (63). Though Gray concedes that Xenophon employs irony—or what she calls Socratic irony—this turns out to mean only that Xenophon is a playful and sarcastic author who uses his wit "to highlight oppression and injustice" (371). But, Gray insists, Xenophon does not conceal his wisdom: his "messages are always clearly flagged, never just for the coterie, but for all readers to perceive" (371).

The approach of Gray has much to recommend itself, at least in principle. She rightly highlights the importance of the theme of leadership for Xenophon, and alone among recent interpreters she illustrates key concepts of his "theory of leadership" from the Socratic works. She also brings together, for comparative analysis and in a useful fashion, various passages from his different writings, insisting that "no passage from any one of [Xenophon's] works can be read without cross-reference" (372). Gray is also right to make the question of how to read Xenophon central to her analysis. This said, however, the execution of her design leaves much to be desired. To begin with, her book contains surprisingly little discussion of the *Anabasis*, though Xenophon's account of how he himself ruled human beings is surely crucial for anyone seeking to clarify his "theory of leadership." (Gray's relative silence about the *Anabasis* reflects the fact that her aim is to combat "darker readings," and she is satisfied that the "*Anabasis* has not yielded much to such readings" [61].) Second, Gray's account is often rather moralistic. Her discussion of the rule of Cyrus the Elder, to take one example, is more enthusiastic than penetrating, and it suffers much in comparison to such enlightening treatments as Christopher Nadon's or Christopher Bruell's.⁸⁵ Indeed, Gray does not succeed in explaining away all the evidence that supports the so-called "darker readings." Her refusal to acknowledge the existence of genuine Socratic irony in Xenophon is equally unconvincing. Finally, Gray does not offer anything like an adequate discussion of several important issues facing rulers—such as the tension between the common good and the demands of moral virtue, or the tension between the good of the ruler and the good of the ruled—which lie at the heart of such works as the *Anabasis* and the *Education of Cyrus*. All too often, she rests satisfied with moralistic clichés and commonplaces (e.g., "the happiness of the ruler is

⁸⁵ Nadon (2001) and Bruell (1987).

impossible unless it rests on the happiness of those he rules": 34–35). In short, Gray has the right general aim but misses the mark.

The most recent monograph on the *Anabasis*, Michael A. Flower's *Xenophon's Anabasis or The Expedition of Cyrus* (2012) is the best recent treatment of the work.⁸⁶ Flower approaches the *Anabasis* from the standpoint of classical history and literary criticism. His primary interest lies in "the representation of the story [of the Ten Thousand] rather than [in] a positivist reconstruction of the facts that lie behind it" (8). Specifically, he seeks to illuminate "the narratological and rhetorical strategies that shape the text" (4). To achieve this goal, Flower concentrates on a number of literary and rhetorical strategies employed by Xenophon—including what he calls "focalization" (85), "narrative economy" (89), "narrative gaps and inconsistencies" (95), "speeches" (99), "characterization" (103), and several others—that enable Xenophon to tell the story of the Ten Thousand in a manner at once vivid, instructive and "deceptively simple" (41).

Flower's monograph is gracefully and cogently argued. He discusses with nuance and insight several passages of the *Anabasis*, including (to name but a few) the obituary of Cyrus (188–92), the entry of Xenophon in the narrative (120–30) and several episodes of the march along the Black Sea and of the campaign in Thrace (114–15 [and 165], 143, 149, 163–64). Flower's reading is informed by an awareness that the interpreter of Xenophon must be able to "read against the grain or between the lines" (169). (Regrettably, the name of Leo Strauss is not mentioned in this monograph, not even in the several bibliographies, though Flower's goal is "to provide as multifaceted an exploration of the *Anabasis* as I am able" [6].) An especially valuable part of the monograph is the sober critique it contains of several theories pertaining to the intention or purpose of the *Anabasis*. Two such theories should be mentioned here. First, Flower shows that purpose of the *Anabasis* is *not* primarily apologetic, as scholars have been claiming for more than a century. That is, the work is *not* designed primarily "to excuse Xenophon for participating in and enriching himself through events that, as an Athenian aristocrat, he should have had no part in" (31). Granted, the *Anabasis* contains "a degree of personal apology" (117), but Flower argues convincingly that the "time lag" between the expedition and the likely moment of composition is problematic for the "apology school": "If the *Anabasis* was written as long after the events described as almost all historians now believe, then [Xenophon's] banishment from Athens may already have been revoked [...] he had earned fame as the writer of several other books (probably

⁸⁶ Oxford University Press, 242 pages.

his Socratic dialogues) and he was almost too old to play a role in political and military affairs. So, unless he was excessively worried about his posthumous reputation and waited some thirty years to address that concern, the overriding purpose of the work is unlikely to be apologetic" (33 and, generally, 30–34). To this cogent line of argument we can only object that Flower is prone to forget his own better reasons and to relapse into viewing the *Anabasis* as a mere defense speech (e.g., "From start to finish, book 7 [of the *Anabasis*] constitutes a defense of Xenophon against charges of being self-serving" [152]; "Book 7 is perhaps the least read but, in many ways, the most important book in the *Anabasis*" [150].)

The second interpretive theory refuted by Flower is the notion that the *Anabasis* is a "panhellenist manifesto" whose underlying message is "if [a] band of mercenaries could so easily defeat the forces of the king and then escape from the interior of Asia, a united Hellenic force under the leadership of a professional general, such as Xenophon himself, could not fail to conquer the Persian Empire" (172). Flower demonstrates through an extensive textual analysis (chap. 7) that Xenophon is not a panhellenist: "The *Anabasis* is a panhellenist tract only on the most simple and unreflective of readings, one that looks for confirmation of stereotypes while ignoring nuance and context" (187). In particular, he shows that Xenophon doubts the feasibility, and, above all, the desirability of any panhellenic enterprise, a doubt developed in the *Education of Cyrus*. For according to the author of the *Anabasis*, "Any would-be Greek conquerors of the Persian Empire would also find Eastern luxury to be corrosive of their traditional lifestyle, ethos and values" (182).

Despite its many qualities, however—and here we could add Flower's deft use of Plutarch, Diodorus Siculus, and Ktésias to vindicate the essential veracity of the *Anabasis* (chap. 3)—this monograph is deficient in two major respects. First, Flower pays only lip service to Socrates. This omission is surprising given that Xenophon himself, according to Flower, "emphasiz[es] his connection to Socrates [...]," presenting Socrates as "the wisest of men," whose advice even "transcends mere human wisdom" (120, 123). Yet Flower's analysis of Xenophon's leadership is silent about the education he received at the hands of the philosopher. (The four Socratic writings are barely alluded to.) Second, Flower treats only superficially "the religious dimensions of the *Anabasis*" (203). To his credit, Flower stresses the importance of the issue. He also distances himself from some of the more misleading claims that have been put forth about Xenophon and piety in recent decades, not least by G. L. Cawkwell. Yet Flower's treatment of Xenophon's stance toward piety and the gods remains conventional (chap. 8). He offers little by way of analysis of the "narratological and rhetorical strategies" employed by Xenophon in the

"construction of his own religious mentality" (4, 204). And the little he does offer merely reaffirms that the author of the *Anabasis* is a man of "deep reverence for the gods" (119). Flower chides contemporary readers who "may take the intrusion of religion [in the *Anabasis*] to be a cynical device for manipulating naive or superstitious readers"; such a conception, he warns, "would itself be a naive and unsophisticated way of viewing Greek religious practices and beliefs" (159). Instead, Flower contends that Xenophon emerges as an effective leader in the *Anabasis* precisely because "he sees himself as being led by the gods" (210). We shall have ample opportunity to assess this contention in this study.

Besides the monographs of Waterfield, Lee, Gray, and Flower, a fifth book should be mentioned: *The Long March: Xenophon and the Ten Thousand* (2004), a collection of essays edited by Robin Lane Fox.⁸⁷ Most contributors to the collection are historians of Antiquity and classicists. Their essays take up such themes as the social organization of the Persian Empire, Xenophon as mercenary, the Ten Thousand as a fighting force, and the army as a deliberating polis. The manner of writing of Xenophon is also examined by several contributors. Yet a substantial majority of them are unsympathetic. As a writer, Xenophon is accused of omitting "large and unpleasant facts"; of being "evasive, apologetic and a master of leaving unwelcome things out"; he is a lawyer pleading his case (5, 45). The opening essay of the collection (by G. L. Cawkwell) lays the foundations for these charges. Cawkwell claims that Xenophon's primary motive for writing the *Anabasis* was to reply to serious accusations that had been leveled against him by a fellow general, Sophainetos the Stumphylian, who had authored a (lost) indictment: "Xenophon had a tale to tell in which he himself had to play the leading part [in the expedition]. Someone had told the tale differently and moved Xenophon to set the record straight. The book [i.e. the *Anabasis*] was in that sense apologia, personal apologia" (67). Though the best essay of the collection (by P. J. Stylianou) rightly questions Cawkwell's hypothesis—a hypothesis put forward in 1972 in an influential essay—the view that the *Anabasis* is primarily "a work of apologetics" is accepted by most of the contributors to this collection (289).⁸⁸ As a result, Xenophon is depicted inaccurately and somewhat darkly—mendacious, intellectually limited, vainglorious. One

⁸⁷ Yale University Press, 351 pages.

⁸⁸ The original essay of Cawkwell is his "Introduction" to *The Persian Expedition* (1972). The essay tries to account for Xenophon's apparent decision to publish the *Anabasis* only many years after his return from Asia. Cawkwell hypothesizes that the account of Sophainetos painted Xenophon unfavorably, prompting him to publish a rejoinder (p. 19). (The account of Sophainetos, if it was indeed written, has been lost, except for four small fragments apparently preserved by the sixth-century scholar Stephanus of Byzantium.)—For my part,

essay raises the question of "how far, [as a ruler, Xenophon] conforms to Socrates's (probable) teaching," but the question is not further treated (193 cf. 10). The theme of rule is of little interest to the contributors, whose purpose is historical, not philosophic—"to return [the *Anabasis*] to the center of cultural histories of the Greeks" (6).

The foregoing survey of the recent literature on the *Anabasis* will have shown, I hope, the need for an interpretation that treats the book as a work of political philosophy and a study in Socratic rule. The *Anabasis* reveals its significance, I believe, only when it is approached as such a work. But the recent literature has overlooked the centrality of philosophy—both as a preparatory training for the exercise of rule and as a way of life in its own right—in the thought of Xenophon. For, when the *Anabasis* is read as it was intended to be read, it points toward Socrates and toward philosophy, the noble and good activity *par excellence*.

Of course, to be able to practice reading as an *art* in this way, one thing is necessary above all, something that has been unlearned most thoroughly nowadays [...], something for which one must almost be a cow and in any case not a "modern man": *rumination*.

Friedrich Nietzsche, *Genealogy of Morals*

I would not dismiss too quickly P. J. Stylianou's doubts that Sophainetos even wrote the account in question: "How is it" (Stylianou writes) "that [Sophainetos's] work, of the first importance if it existed, is not known to anyone through all the long centuries of antiquity, with the single exception of the Byzantine drudge Stephanus? With this single, very late exception [i.e. almost a thousand years after Xenophon's *Anabasis*], only Xenophon was known in antiquity to have participated in the march of the Ten Thousand and to have written an account of it" (p. 70). But even if we concede that Sophainetos did write a book, as I am inclined to do, Xenophon indicates with perfect clarity in the *Anabasis* how he assesses the man: Sophainetos is useless at a critical moment (2.5.37), he is fined by the soldiers for neglecting his duties (5.8.1), he is of bad judgment and somewhat cowardly (6.5.13), he is only fit to rule noncombatants, women, and children, or to be put in charge of the baggage train (4.4.19–22, esp. §22; 5.3.1). To suggest that a masterpiece like Xenophon's *Anabasis* was written *primarily* to answer such a man, whose book, if it ever existed, must have reflected the deficiencies of its author, is untenable.—In addition to Cawkwell's essays, the reader may consider Dürrbach's old but still influential "L'Apologie de Xénophon dans l'*Anabase*" (1893). Dürrbach is an even more extreme example of the tendency to attack Xenophon on the basis of bald assertions, unsupported hypotheses, or worse.

PART I

THE KINGSHIP OF CYRUS